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The majority of managers set themselves some long-term coefficient-objective 
for the distribution of dividends in relation to the profits of the period (target 
payout ratio). But they do not mechanically apply this ratio to each year’s 
profits as they try to avoid brusque fluctuations which could provoke 
movements in investors’ positions in imperfect markets.  
The purpose of this paper is to verify whether the dividend distribution policy of 
a company depends not only on profit but also on other factors, amongst which 
the both the theoretical and empirical literature point to the following: the 
profitability of the company, the stability of its earnings, its rate of growth and 
opportunities for investment and its financial and governing structure, 
highlighting the institutional aspects of the financial systems of the countries in 
which banks operate. 
The results obtained in the empirical test allow us to affirm that the policy of 
payouts does not depend solely on business profits. We observe that the 
economic and financial factors proposed by the theories mentioned, along with 
institutional factors, in practice determine the dividends of companies according 
to the structure of government which exists within organisations.  
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DIVIDEND POLICY OF EUROPEAN BANKS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although there are many studies which analyse companies’ dividend policy, 
they are inconclusive. Nowadays the existence or lack of an optimum decision 
on the distribution of dividends is a puzzle whose pieces do not fit together 
perfectly1. The importance of the problem lies in discovering the level of 
distribution of dividends which permits an equilibrium between the internal 
resources the company needs to finance part of its investments and the interests 
of shareholders.  
The problem has been studied from two points of view. The first group of 
works attempts to discover the relationship which exists between the dividends 
distributed by a company amongst its shareholders and the price which these 
shareholders are prepared to pay for the company’s shares. A second group of 
studies, which include the present paper, seek those factors which managers 
consider when setting the rate of dividend distribution of the companies they 
manage.  
The company can direct its dividend policy towards the maintenance of a 
fixed rate of distribution of dividends or it can adjust this rate to its economic 
and financial situation; in other words, it can try to smooth out the distribution 
of benefits á la Lintner (1956), aiming to achieve an objective distribution rate 
which will not be influenced by variations in short-term investment (Fama and 
French, 1998a and 2000) or, by contrast, condition its dividend policy not only 
to business profits but also to other factors, amongst which the theoretical and 
empirical literature points out the following: the profitability of the company, 
the stability of its earnings, its rate of growth and opportunities for investment 
and its financial and governing structure (Barclay, Smith and Watts, 1995; 
Gaver and Gaver, 1993). 
The fact that dividend policy does not depend solely on business profits 
has lead us to analyse, from a positive approach, the factors which in practice 
determine the dividends of banks according to their governing structure, 
emphasising the institutional aspects of the financial systems of their countries 
of origin.  
                                                                        
1 A concept coined by Black (1976) as the methodological basis of one of the best 




With this purpose in mind, the paper is organised as follows: In the 
second section we present a brief review and justification of the various 
viewpoints regarding companies’ dividend policy. In this epigraph we also 
enumerate a series of institutional factors, relative to the financial system of the 
country in which the companies operate, which may affect their dividend policy. 
In addition we describe various alternative theories from the contractual 
approach which attempt to explain the factors which determine such policies. In 
the third epigraph we present the empirical part of the paper which, using data 
from the period 1991-1998, supplied by the data base Bank Scope selects a 
sample of European financial entities. Using the panel data technique, we test 
whether at an international level the hypotheses of the relevance of dividend 
policies and of partial dividend adjustment are fulfilled. In the final section, we 
analyse the results and draw conclusions from the study. 
 
2. THEORIES OF COMPANY DIVIDEND POLICY 
The traditional posture regarding company dividend policy considers that the 
market value of shares increases when managers opt for a high target payout 
ratio (Gordon, 1959). Later, Miller and Modigliani (1961) proposed that in a 
capital market where there are no imperfections such as taxes, transaction costs 
and asymmetric information and agency costs, the dividend policy of a company 
is an irrelevant question for the market value of its shares.  
However, in the majority of countries there is an unfavourable tax effect 
for investors who obtain rent via dividends which may lead them to design their 
own dividend policy. Several pieces of research have attempted to evaluate the 
relevance of tax on dividends testing the hypothesis of tax effect compared with 
the client effect; empirical evidence shows that shareholders create portfolios to 
neutralise the greater tax burden on dividends as compared with capital gains tax 
(Brenan, 1970; Miller and Scholes, 1978; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979, 
1980 and 1982). As the results are not conclusive, one needs to look to other 
explanations related with problems of information and uncertainty suffered by 
companies in order to understand the influence that dividend policies can have 
on the valuation of shares and to discover what factors determine these policies 
in practice. In Germany, where the tax differences aren’t so importants, Amihud 
and Murgia (1997) suggest other reasons apart from the taxes to explain the 
dividends payout of companies. 
When asymmetric information causes adverse selection problems, 
dividends are a signal used by the internal members of the company to transmit 
credible information to the market concerning the quality of its investment 




1996). Other authors (Bhattcharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; Bernheim, 
1991; Bernheim and Wantz, 1995) consider, however, that dividends would 
have no informative effect if it were not for the higher tax rates that they impose 
on shareholders. Miller and Rock (1985) demonstrate from a theoretical 
viewpoint that there exists a signalling equilibrium under asymmetric 
information.  
Particularly, Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1994) and Bessler and Nohel 
(1996) postulate that the announcement effect of dividend reductions should be 
more severe for banks that for non financial firms due to the fact that “large 
banks may lose large corporate customers if the bank is feared to have financial 
difficulties as evidenced by the fact that dividends need to be cut” (Bessler and 
Nohel, 1996). 
Faced with problems of moral risk, a greater payout of dividends will be 
translated into a cut-back in the discretionality which managers have over their 
available resources, obliging them to have greater recourse to capital markets to 
satisfy the financial needs of the company as suggested by Rozeff (1982), 
Easterbrook, (1984), Jensen (1986), Lang and Litzenberger (1989) and Yoon 
and Starks (1995) among others2-. Evidence suggest too that, in financial firms, 
a measure of the manager´s portfolio diversification opportunity set and bank 
size affect the dividend policy (Mercado-Mendez and Willey, 1995). In addition, 
the regular payment of dividends avoids bondholders winning over shareholders 
since company risk may vary and the impact that debt may have on investment 
decisions. Another proposition arises when the financing of a company may be 
conditioned by the existence of a pecking order in the different sources of funds, 
such that resources generated by the company itself have preference over 
external funds in the financing of investment projects (Myers, 1984). When the 
banks own a main percentage of the ownership of the company -as it occurs in 
many european firms the pecking order theory is a good explanation of the 
dividend policy adopted by companies as Giner and Salas (1995) show for a 
sample of Spanish firms. From the perspective of this theory, when resources 
generated increase, the response of dividend policy will be opposite in sign and 
the benefits paid out will increase  (Fama and French, 2000). 
 
 
                                                                        
2 These last two works contrast the theory of free cash flow vs. the theory of signals 
with the idea that the company, during periods of growth, has a dividend policy oriented more 
towards sending positive signals to the market than to reducing the discretionality of 
managers. In any case, the results obtained differ, so further studies would be needed to reach 




2.1.  THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND DIVIDEND POLICY  
In the last few years, researchers have tried to discover whether the model of 
dividend payout in companies is the same in different countries or whether, on 
the contrary, different institutional frameworks have an influence on the policy 
of benefit distribution.  
Dewenter and Warther (1998) affirm that the fewer agency conflicts 
which occur in Japanese companies compared with North American companies 
mean that differences exist between their respective dividend policies; that is, 
that the differences between organisational structures of the companies in these 
two countries determine their dividend policies.  
In a study carried out of the dividend policies of 4.000 companies in 33 
countries, La Porta et al. (1998) observe that companies operating in countries 
whose legislation gives greater protection to minority shareholders pay more 
dividends, which would back the validity of the agency model in which 
dividends are the result of the legal protection of investors, contrary to the 
agency model in which dividends are a substitute for legal protection and where 
managers seek to establish the good reputation of their company via dividend 
policies. The results obtained by these authors are inconsistent with the tax 
theory of dividends and do not provide information about dividends as a 
mechanism for the transmission of signals to capital markets.  
Aidvaizain, Booth and Clearly (1998) compare the Lintner model for 300 
companies in developing countries with an amplified model in which other 
additional variables are introduced. The results they obtain provide evidence that 
dividends are more sensitive to the companies’ profits than to delayed dividends 
and that they are less used as signalling mechanisms in institutional structures 
oriented towards the bank than in those oriented to the market. These authors 
consider that the relationship between debt, investment and dividends are similar 
in all the countries and that the theory of financial signalling is more suitable for 
those countries in which companies are financed through capital markets, since 
these alleviate problems of asymmetric information, thus reducing the need for 
them to have recourse to dividend policies.  
The possible conflict of interests between the shareholders and creditors 
of a company is used by Leuz, Deller and Stuberdader (1997) as a starting point 
for the comparison of restrictions in dividend payments to shareholders in 
Germany, U.S.A. and the United Kingdom. Their results confirm that the 
restrictions to payment of dividends are similar in the three countries despite 
their institutional differences. However, the origin of these restrictions is 
different: in the U.S.A and the United Kingdom, they are due to debt contracts 




justify these results in such a way that we can affirm that restrictive clauses in 
contracts, established by the company with its creditors, influence the payout of 
dividends and the conflict of interests which arise from agency relationships 
between its shareholders and bondholders.  
These studies show that different institutional frameworks have an 
influence on policies of distribution of benefits and that the theoretical 
justifications applied are different according to the financial system in which the 
company is operating. As a result of these studies and of the analysis done by 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) for the structure of capital in G-7 countries, the 
institutional effects which may be relevant for a company’s decisions on 
dividends are: 
1. Orientation of companies to the capital market vs. orientation to 
the bank.  
2. Restrictions to dividend payouts as a result of the debt contracts 
stablished by the company. 
3. The separation of ownership and control in organisations which 
determines the government of the company.  
4. The existence of laws which protect the minority shareholders of 
a company. 
The first institutional difference we have alluded to which weighs up the 
greater or lesser importance of the bank as against the capital market in the 
financing of companies implies such a vast differential element that two 
principle models of financial systems are usually contrasted: the Anglo-Saxon 
model based on the market -common to countries such as U.S.A., Canada and 
the United Kingdom- and the continental European model- which also includes 
countries like Japan- based on banks. 
La Porta et al. (1998, 2000a y 2000b) distinguish four institutional 
systems: three systems which come from the civil law tradition and are French, 
German and Scandinavian and one which comes from the common law 
tradition. The evidence shows that each country belongs to one system due to 
dominating tradition of that country and that is the reason of the orientation of 
companies towards the bank or towards the capital markets for financing their 
operations. The countries which come from the civil law tradition use the banks 
more frequently while the countries which come from the common law tradition 
more often use the capital markets. 
Due to the practical effects and looking at the empirical study we have 




two: a system orientated to the bank that comes from the civil law tradition and 
a system orientated to the capital market which comes from the common law 
tradition. 
 
2.2. FACTORS DETERMINING DIVIDEND POLICIES IN THE LIGHT 
OF THREE EXPLANATORY THEORIES 
The conceptual framework in which our paper is set, the contractual approach, 
will serve as a reference to determine those factors which affect the dividend 
policy of companies: the theory of signals, the theory of free cash flow and a 
reputation model: in each model, the decision to distribute profits or not depends 
on factors particular to each company and on institutional factors. 
 
2.2.1. The theory of signals 
Within the framework of problems of asymmetry of information existing in the 
heart of the company, the theory of signals defines dividend policy as a 
signalling mechanism through which internal shareholders, within management, 
reveal their incentives and private information to external shareholders. This 
information may modify the value of shares if the announcement of dividends 
contains relevant information concerning the company’s expectations which has 
not already been discounted by the market. External shareholders reflect in the 
price of shares the value they attribute to the new information available and 
express through these variations their degree of conformity with the company’s 
financial policy and the behaviour of management3 (Aharony and Swary, 1980; 
Bhattacharya, 1979 and 1980; John and Williams, 1985; Ambarish, John and 
Williams, 1987). 
In real capital markets it is observed that a variation in the payout ratio is 
generally followed by changes in the price of shares. This situation deserves a 
reflection on the information content of dividends4: when a company adopts a 
stable dividend policy through time; that is, when it sets a target payout ratio, 
there is an isolation of dividends á la Lintner such that, consistent with the 
                                                                        
3 Investors interpret a variation in the payout ratio as a change in the expectations of 
managers as to the company’s future profits. In this case it could be affirmed that alterations 
in dividend policy provide information to the share market: an increase in dividend payouts is 
interpreted as good news.  
4 The payout of dividends can be seen as a way to lessen asymmetric information both 
in its exante aspect or problems of adverse selection and in its ex post aspect or problems of 




signalling hypothesis, the dividend paid depends on the profits earned and on the 
dividend paid the previous year.  
In those countries where the dividends paid are more sensitive to profits 
earned and less to the dividend paid the previous year -due to the effect of 
institutional factors of the financial system which follows a market model or a 
bank model- then the policy of distribution of profits moves more quickly to its 
objective level and, therefore, the decision as to dividends is used less as a 
mechanism to transmit information to capital markets -as Aidvaizain, Booth and 
Clearly (1999) suggets -. 
 
2.2.2. The free cash flow theory 
The starting point for this theory, which proposes an argument based on agency 
costs that relates dividends paid by the company to its investment opportunities, 
is that managers cannot be controlled perfectly so they can seek to satisfy their 
own interests instead of the interest of shareholders. Managers, once they have 
satisfied all the obligations contracted by the company with funds generated by 
operations, can use the remaining flows from the treasury for their own benefit 
(Jensen, 1986). 
 In a study which jointly examined dividend policy, participation in its 
capital of internal shareholders and the level of financial leverage of the 
company, Jensen, Solberg and Zorm (1992) obtain the empirical evidence that 
the dividends paid by the company are negatively related to its financial 
leverage and to the participation of internal shareholders in its capital. These 
results are consistent with the explanation of  the dividend policy of companies 
proposed in the hypothesis of “free cash flow” of Jensen (1986)5. 
Agrawall and Jayaraman (1994) compare, on one hand the dividend 
policy of companies in debt and of companies not in debt and, on the other hand, 
that of companies with a high degree of participation of shareholders in their 
capital (where presumably the interests of shareholders and of managers are 
more in line) and that of companies with low participation. These authors’ 
results show that companies in debt and with low presence of managers amongst 
their shareholders have higher target payout ratios.  
The use of dividend policy as a way of reducing free cash flows is 
conditioned by the existence of alternatives for the control of managers’ 
                                                                        
5 The theory of free cash flow has also been used to validate models for prediction of 
bankruptcy of  companies. These models evaluate whether the retention of profits may act as 




behaviour. Companies with big investment opportunities have less recourse to 
dividend policy since cash flows which remain free are necessary for the 
financing of future investment projects. In countries whose financial system is 
oriented to the market, the control of managerial behaviour is done through 
capital markets. While in those countries where the financial system is oriented 
towards a bank model, the bank debt contracted by the company serves as an 
alternative mechanism to dividend policy to reduce the conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders.  
 
2.2.3. The monitoring hypothesis 
This hypothesis, which began with the work of Easterbrook (1984), suggests 
that dividends can help to reduce the agency costs associated with the separation 
of ownership and control which occurs in companies. When the ownership of 
the company is highly diversified, individual investors have few incentives to 
control the actions of managers and if they do, the result is high costs for the 
company. The dividend policy forces the managers to go increasingly to the 
capital market, submitting their behaviour to the evaluation made by the market 
6. 
In countries whose financial system is market oriented, managers have 
incentives to align their interests with those of shareholders in order to maintain 
a good reputation in the capital market which will be reflected positively in the 
price of its shares. For this reason, management, to ensure its position in the 
company, will try to avoid dividend payout decisions which they think will be 
unpopular amongst the company’s shareholders -as La Porta et al. (2000a) 
suggest-. 
In countries whose model is bank oriented, managers seek to be on good 
terms with the company’s creditors to be able to obtain future financing. To do 
this they will avoid policies of dividend payments which cause a transfer of 
wealth from bondholders to shareholders without exceeding -or even reaching 
the maximum limit- the possible clauses established in debt contracts and which 
restrict the distribution of dividends.  
 
 
                                                                        
6 Easterbrook (1984) suggests another explanation of dividend policy based on agency 
costs associated with debt contracts established by the company, which we will refer to when 





3.1. THE MODEL PROPOSED AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES  
Lintner (1956) elaborates a model in which he affirms that the dividend policy 
of a company can be summed up in two equations: the first includes the annual 
variation in dividends and the second expresses the objective dividend as a 
constant proportion of profits obtained. 
Dt – Dt-1 = α + b (Dt – Dt-1)                                (1) 
Dt = r BNt                                                       (2) 
where: 
- r : target payout ratio. 
- α : constant. 
- b: adjustment  coefficient. 
- BNt : net profits obtained in period t. 
- DIVt, DIVt-1: dividends paid in periods t and t-1. 
- µt: random disruption of the model. 
The model proposed in this paper by Lintner (1956), however, because of 
the existence of asymmetric information, the separation of ownership and 
control and conflicts of interests between members, considers that the company 
opts for an asymmetric dividend policy, in which there is a parameter b which 
added to the payout ratio r, reflects how the distribution of dividends varies in 
time. For this reason it is necessary to find a model with partial adjustment  
which includes delayed values of the variable one is trying to explain7. 
DIVt = α + brBNt + (1-b) DIVt-1 + µt                         (3) 
Adjustments in the dividend policy of companies may be due to so one 
needs to take these facts into account in the model to increase its capacity to 
explain. 
From the three theories put forward in the previous section we consider the 
following to be determining in policies of dividend share out:  
1.- Net profits of the period. 
                                                                        
7   This model has been applied by Gutiérrez, Rodríguez and Vallelado (1984) to the 




2.- Dividend in earlier periods. 
3.- Growth of the company. 
4.- Level of indebtedness. 
5.- Separation of ownership and control. 
6.- Institutional factors. 
These factors, based on the agency theory, explain the influence that the 
dividend decision has on the conflicts of interest that may arise between 
managers, shareholders and company creditors -an influence approximated by 
the relationship between payout and the level of debt-, the problems of 
asymmetric information which exist in the heart of the company and the 
governance of the enterprise due to the separation of ownership and control8.  
The generalised partial adjustment model we are going to test in this paper 
is the following: 
DIVt = α + β1 ROAt + β2 DIVt-1 + β3gt + β4 Lt + β5 LOGACTt + β6 ANGLOt + µt      (4) 
where: 
- DIVt: dividend payout ratio of the period is the quotient 
between dividends paid out and total assets.  
- ROAt: ratio of economic yield is the quotient between net 
profits and the book value of the bank’s total assets.  
- DIVt-1: dividend payout ratio of the previous period is the 
quotient between the dividends paid out in the previous period and the 
book value of the bank’s total assets.  
- MB is maket to book ratio. 
- Lt: level of indebtedness is the quotient between the book value 
of external resources and the book value of its total assets.  
We are going to use the following control variables: 
- LOGACTt: neperian logarithm of the book value of the bank’s 
total assets9. 
                                                                        
8 The model used does not include ownership variables dut to the fact of the database 
employed does not have that information. 
9 This variable is used to measure the growth opportunities of banks. In other research 
work the variable of market value/book value and the q of Tobin are used. However, the lack 




- ANGLOt: dummy variable used to test the effect of institutional 
factors on  dividend policies adopted by banks according to whether 
they operate in market or bank oriented financial systems.  
 The insertion in the basic partial adjustment model of the determining 
factors in dividend policy adopted by companies is done through a series of 
ratios due to the need to normalise the variables. We do this normalisation by 
using companies’ total assets instead of using other variables such as private 
resources, net profit and price of shares10.  
3.2. HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED 
The current paper analyses whether the generalised partial adjustment proposed 
provides a better explanation than the Lintner (1956) model. The Lintner (1956) 
model allows us to test the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Companies smooth out their dividend policies to try 
to adjust them to a long-term target payout ratio which they set as 
an objective and which is proportional to the profits obtained and 
the dividend of the previous year.  
The generalised partial adjustment model, which should provide a better 
explanation than the previous model, can be used to test these hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2: A higher rate of economic yield, the result of an 
increase in profits, makes a proportional increase in dividend 
payout possible. 
Normalisation of the variables included in the model means using yield as 
a factor to explain the dividend policies of banks instead of profits. An increase 
in the yield of the company when its profits increase allows for higher dividend 
payouts.  
Hypothesis 3: The use of debt by banks is a way of restricting 
discretionality in the behaviour of its managers and of using this 
decision as an alternative mechanism to dividends, which means 
that as financial leverage increases, then the handing out of 
dividends is less necessary.  
As the financial leverage of the bank increases, so its debt capacity 
diminishes, there are greater restrictions on the paying of dividends -because of 
                                                                        
10 This criteria is used by Aidvazian, Booth and Clearly (1998). Giner and Salas 
(1995) normalize using the asset at reposition prices and López and Rodríguez (1998) use the 




the greater financial pressure which the organisation is under- and the 
substitution effect which debt could have as an alternative mechanism to 
dividends for sending signals to the market on the situation of the company is 
greater. 
Hypothesis 4: Banks which have higher rates of growth have 
greater need for resources, which leads them to reduce the 
dividends they pay to their shareholders.  
Banks with good opportunities for growth need greater volumes of funds 
to face their future investment projects. One possibility is the self-financing of a 
good part of these projects  by reducing the dividends they pay to their 
shareholders.  
In short, the significance of the independent variables of the generalised 
model give it greater explanatory power and allows us to verify that the dividend 
decision contains information and is inter-related with the other financial 
decisions.  
Once we have tested the validity of the hypotheses proposed it is very 
important to check whether the dummy variable ANGLO included in our model 
is significant such that, as we mentioned in the theory section of this paper, the 
theoretical justifications as to why companies pay dividends will be different. 
The variable LOGACT, which measures company size, permits us to check 





3.3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY USED 
The empirical investigation analyses financial entities, to try to discover 
the effects of the specific characteristics of banks on the relevancy of their 
dividend policies. The data base used in the investigation is the BANK SCOPE 
which contains data, from between 1991-1998, of 484 European banks 
belonging to 22 countries. 
The empirical testing of the model used to analyse those factors which 
determine the dividend policies of the banks in the available sample is done 




individually the values taken by a series of variables through time11. This 
technique, although it has multiple advantages over cross-sectional analysis, also 
has drawbacks. The most important is the existence of constant unobservable 
effects co-related with explanatory variables which make the ordinary least 
square indicators inconsistent. One possible solution to this problem would be to 
use intragroup estimation, but these estimators are only consistent when the 
explanatory variables considered in the model are exogenous: that is, they are 
not co-related with the random disruption of the model. In our case, the 
existence of both individual effects and of problems of endogeneity lead us to 
consider the variables in first differences and to estimate the parameters of the 
model by the generalised method of moments12. In addition, statistical models 
used for analysis of temporal and cross-sectional data entail serious 
complications when applied to censored variables (Maddala, 1987). 
The procedure used for the estimation of the model, bearing in mind that 
dividends are a censored variable which does not take negative values nor values 
above one, is the Tobit method. This procedure consists in obtaining, first of all, 
estimations of the dependent censored variable using annual estimations of the 
partial adjustment model described in equation (3) and with the variables at 
levels. Once these predictions have been obtained, they substitute the values of 
the original variable in the panel data and one then estimates the generalised 
model in equation (4) as if the problem of censored data did not exist13.  
4. RESULTS 
Tables I to VIII show the values obtained by applying the Tobit method to 
equation (3) of our paper to censor the variable dividends. It can be seen how the 
estimators obtained for these delayed dividends are significant at 99% in all the 
periods except in 1993 whose p value is 0,32 for the variable delayed dividends: 
furthermore, the values obtained for statistic R squared allow us to deduce the 
overall significance of the estimators and the goodness of the partial adjustment 
model, used to obtain the censored variable in all the periods analysed.  
 
                                                                        
11 The panel data used is characterized by being incomplete and unbalanced. 
Specifically, the variant of the panel data chosen for this work is the so-called micropanel. 
This is a set of data in which the dominant dimension corresponds to the number of 
individuals. The number of periods is far lower.  
12 The estimation of the parameters of the model was done using the DPD (Dynamic 
Panel Data) written by Arellano and Bond (1988). 
13 This solution proposed by Arellano and Bover (1988) has been applied to the 






REGRESSION MODEL TO CENSOR THE VARIABLE DIVIDENDS 











































































In brackets the standard deviation of the 
estimated coefficients of the variables. 
*** Significance at 99% 
** Significance at 95% 





In a second stage, as we enunciated in an earlier section, we apply the 
panel data methodology using the censored variable of dividends. The results 




VARIABLES IN FIRST DIFFERENCES  













Wald test of joint significance 15288,552*** (5) 
Wald test of joint significance of all 
dummies 
        38,8088***(5) 
Wald test of joint significance of time 
dummies 
     16,2370*** (5) 
Wald test of joint significance for ANGLO 
dummy 
   15,2754***(5) 
Sargan test 53,3722 (10) 
m1 -2,086 (475) 
m2 1,578 (331) 
*** Significance at  99%. ** Significance at 95%. *Significance at 90%. 
 
 
The Wald test allows us to test the null hypothesis of all the coefficients, 
except the constant term. This statistic is distributed according to a function χ2r 
with a number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of coefficients 
estimated. The p value represents the maximum level of significance for which 
the null hypothesis of absence of overall significance for all the regressors is 
rejected. In the two values of the statistic obtained we can observe that the 
significance of the variables allows us to accept that dividend policy is 
established as a decision process with adjustments in which a target ratio is not 
rigidly applied. Variables related with the economic and financial situation of 





The significance obtained in the test of Wald for the variable dummy 
ANGLO tells us that the discrimination made in the countries in the sample is 
significant and that the different institutional aspects of these two financial 
systems can have an influence on the dividend policies adopted by banks.  
The Sargan test or test of conditions of overidentification allows us to test 
the null hypothesis that the restrictions of overidentification used are valid, that 
is, that the instruments are valid. This statistic is distributed according to a 
function χ2r where r is the number of overidentification conditions, that is, the 
difference between the number of conditions of orthogonality and the number of 
coefficients estimated. In this test, the rejection of the null hypothesis suggests 
an inadequate selection of instruments, due, for example, to an erroneous 
characterisation of the autocorrelation or, to the lack of correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the instruments. The Wald tests test the significance 
of the coefficients: SC: overall significance; DA: annual dummies. 
The m1 and m2 tests allow us to detect the eventual first order and second 
order serial autocorrelation. The statistics are distributed according to a normal 
typified function, the null hypothesis being the absence of correlation (Arellano 
and Bonds, 1991).   
Table VIII shows a positive relationship between earnings and dividends 
such that an increase in profits enables higher payouts. In market oriented 
countries financial entities will try to increase their market presence through 
their dividend policy in order to have a good company reputation, while in bank 
oriented countries, the most profitable entities pay higher dividends to reduce 
managerial discretionality in the use of funds.  
As for financial leverage, the results in table VIII coincide with 
hypothesis 3 such that companies with a higher level of debt pay out lower 
dividends. In this way both decisions act as alternative mechanisms to restrict 
the possible discretionality of managers with free cash flows. In this case the 
good reputation the company seeks is with its creditors to ensure the attainment 
of debt in the future. It will therefore fulfil the restrictions to dividends proposed 
by the debt contracts -principally in market oriented countries- or by legal 
regulations -more common to bank oriented countries-.  
In addition, the inclusion in the model of financially sustainable growth 
means that those companies with growth opportunities -a company with future 
investment projects obtains higher values of the variable g-, require great 
quantities of financing which will lead them to put the breaks on dividend 
payments. However, the coefficient we obtain is positive, although not 





significant dependence between growth opportunities and dividends, contrary to 
research, is because the variable used is not the appropriate one14. 
The negative influence of size with respect to the dividend decision 
highlights that the greater size of companies brings about a global reduction in 
problems of asymmetric information, -results which are in agreement with 
Aidvazian, Booth and Cleary (1999)- and make the use of dividends as a 
mechanism to reduce these problems less necessary15. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In answer to the question we posed in the introduction about the factors which 
influence the dividend policies of financial entities, we can conclude from the 
results of our investigation that this financial decision is a relevant decision 
which contains information in itself and not only reflects information already 
transmitted by profits and that European financial entities seek to achieve a 
target payout ratio: The Lintner model is a good approximation to the decision 
adopted.  
The policy of dividend payout put into practice by European banks is also 
influenced by the different institutional frameworks of the financial systems of 
the countries in which they operate. Among these factors, especially relevant is 
the orientation to the market -common in Anglo-Saxon countries- as compared 
with orientation to the bank -common in European countries- and the origin of 
restrictions to dividends because of debt contracted by companies -according to 
what has been established in the contract or is regulated by law-.  
With regard to this, we checked that the factors influencing dividend 
policies proposed by the three explanatory theories referred to -theory of signals, 
hypothesis of free cash flow and the reputation model- determine this financial 
policy and justify the payout decision adopted by entities within the institutional 
framework in which they undertake their operations.  
                                                                        
14 The variable Market to Book ratio is more frequently used in investigation, or a 
measure of the q of Tobin. However, the fact that the data base BANKSCOPE does not 
include market values prevents us from using this measure.  
15 Regarding this relationship, other authors, by contrast, have discovered a positive 
influence between the size of the company and dividend share out because it causes greater 
problems expost in these companies which means they have recourse to dividend decisions to 






In this way, the most profitable companies have greater profits and can 
increase their payouts, while the most indebted companies pay lower dividends: 
in this latter relationship it has been verified that the financing decision of the 
company and the dividend decision act as alternative mechanisms to reduce 
agency problems such that they send signals to the market about the situation of 
the company at the same time as they reduce problems of moral risk in the heart 
of the organisation, by diminishing free cash flows which could be used with 
discretion by managers. From this perspective we can also affirm that the most 
indebted companies find themselves under greater pressure from taxation 
authorities such that they will tend to reduce payouts to be able to face 
contracted obligations. 
In short, the reasons put forward confirm the propositions suggested by 
the financial theory of the agency and we can justify that the arguments used by 
this theory are perfectly adequate to put together the dividend puzzle and to 
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